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In this paper, we propose a process-oriented trust framework that 
integrates an integrity-based trust model with the requirements 
and perceptions of those who manage and administer computing 
infrastructure. This integration enables a feedback loop between 
the system administrator and established models of trust that have 
been proposed to harden and secure systems. The proposed study 
will engage administrators in the design and use of mechanisms 
for establishing and evaluating the trust of cyberinfrastructure. 
The proposed study addresses a gap in current security research, 
which often views users as managers of a single computer, and 
not as an administrator of large computing environments. This 
work seeks to capture system administrators’ perceptions of 
security and trust and incorporate real-world practices into the 
design of mechanisms for securing systems. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection. 
General Terms 
Trust, Measurement, Performance, Design, Security, Human 
Factors. 
Keywords 
Trusted Platform Module, Trusted Computing, User Trust 
Requirements.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Trust is central to relationships among people, technologies, and 
organizations in society. When people provide sensitive 
information about themselves to organizations, they trust those 
organizations to protect that information from going into the 
wrong hands. From an access control infrastructure perspective, 
people expect that only the appropriate entities will have access to 
their sensitive information, and that organizations have 
mechanisms in place to ensure that unauthorized entities cannot 
gain access. Unfortunately, recent security breaches at Anthem® 
and Target® demonstrate that the level of trust people place in 
organizations that are responsible for handling their sensitive 
information can be undeserved [1, 19]. The importance of trust is 
perhaps best illuminated by considering the consequences of loss 
of trust. For example, after their security breach, Target® 
estimated that, they lost upwards of $148 million and expected 
earnings to drop to 78 cents a share from 85 cents a share, 
reflecting more cautious consumer spending [1]. 
Given the proliferation of malware and software bugs, that often 
leave our computing systems in a compromised state, we are often 
making a leap of faith that the computing application or system 
will perform as expected. Even with advanced security features of 
operating systems that require the verification of digital signatures 
before software is loaded, these systems are still vulnerable to 
compromise when private keys are stolen and digitally signed 
malware makes its way into a system. Recent reports state that 
there has been an increase in digitally signed malware since 
Stuxnet [5, 32].  Furthermore, while code signing may be 
effective in indicating the identity of the producer of a piece of 
code when certificates have not been compromised, it is not an 
effective means for indicating software trustworthiness since 
automated verifiers may ignore the files when validating the 
signature [5]. 
Various approaches have been proposed in the literature to 
establish and assess trust in a system. One overarching theme of 
these approaches is to harden the system in order to limit the 
introduction of malicious software. The underlying premise is that 
systems must have a secure configuration before they can be 
trusted to detect and respond to threats and vulnerabilities [3]. 
Requirements for hardening and securing systems have been 
previously proposed [3, 6, 18, 21-22, 24]. These requirements 
include, specifying secure configurations, and verifying the origin 
and the integrity of software. Such requirements establish a model 
for trust and lay the foundation on which the trusted computing 
paradigm was built.  If we can harden systems, we can reduce the 
likelihood that vulnerabilities will remain undetected for long 
periods of time.  
There are many unanswered questions related to our ability to 
establish, assess, and maintain trust of our cyberinfrastructure 
components, including: Why do compromises go undetected and 
persist for extended periods of time?  How do system 
administrators (i.e., those responsible for implementing plans for 
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managing and securing computing infrastructure) assess and 
measure trustworthiness?   Are measures for hardening systems 
ready for wide-scale deployment (i.e., multiple machines within 
an organization)? Would they enable users who manage and 
secure systems to do so more efficiently and effectively? Would 
the trust benefits of such devices be perceived as such by these 
system administrators? To address these questions, we propose to 
evaluate: an organization’s functional and non-functional 
requirements, the mechanisms that are being used to assess the 
trust of the system, the administrators’ perceptions of trust, and 
how these perceptions affect how they manage and secure 
systems. For example, organizations that support instruction and 
training must also support dynamic changes in infrastructure 
components.  These dynamic changes may limit the applicability 
and effectiveness of integrity-based trust mechanisms that are 
better suited for more static environments.  It is not sufficient to 
uniformly apply mechanisms to protect sensitive data and 
hardware resources.  
McCune et al. [21] propose a simplified model that would serve as 
a root of trust for a user.  While designed with the user in mind, 
no current research assesses user perceptions of such a device, 
whether it satisfies users’ trust requirements and is deemed usable 
by those who manage an organization’s computing infrastructure.  
In addition, there is no research that has looked at the effects of 
such assessment mechanisms on system administrators’ 
perceptions of trust. For example, are hardware modules, like 
trusted platform modules being deployed to assess the integrity of 
cyber-infrastructure? 
In this paper, we present a new trust framework that integrates 
behavioral and perception-based trust models. The framework 
also accounts for administrators’ trust requirements. To validate 
the model, we propose a scale development study aimed at 
understanding trust requirements and subsequently measuring the 
trust perceptions of individuals who manage and secure 
computing infrastructure.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
Trust is “the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act 
dependably, securely and reliably within a specified context” [16]. 
Trust can be further decomposed into two categories: social trust 
and behavioral trust. Social trust is the belief in the safety or 
goodness of something because of reputation, association, 
recommendation, or perceived benefit. Behavioral trust, on the 
other hand, is the belief in the safety or goodness of something 
because it attests or proves that its actions meet the trusted 
criteria. Siegrist and Cvetkovich [27] argue that when an 
individual lacks knowledge about a hazard, social trust of 
authorities managing the hazards determines perceived risks and 
benefits. Their results suggest that the lay public relies on social 
trust when making judgments of risks and benefits when personal 
knowledge about a hazard is lacking.  
Traditional assessment mechanisms like recommendation, 
reputation, and referral are used to determine whether to trust an 
entity. These mechanisms may be effective when used in social 
interactions between humans or maybe even technology assisted 
interactions with a centralized system. These mechanisms, often 
manually executed, are far less effective when used to assess the 
trust of a distributed entity. To be effective, your assessment 
mechanism must determine whether you are communicating with 
the appropriate entity, whether that entity’s software will behave 
as expected, and whether the underlying communication 
infrastructure is functioning properly. The problem of assessing 
trust is further complicated by the proliferation of malware, faulty 
software, and various other security attacks (i.e., spoofing, 
phishing/imposter systems, etc.).  
In this work, we propose to look at the user as a manager and an 
administrator of the infrastructure, not as the consumer who 
depends on the infrastructure to be in a trustworthy state.  Security 
researchers have regarded the user in three ways. 1) The most 
common is the user of the functionality that the system or 
infrastructure provides. 2) Less common is the description of a 
user as the creator or developer of software. 3) Even less common 
is evocation of users as managers of infrastructure.  
Multiple security researchers have proposed models for 
establishing trusted systems. These researchers motivate the need 
for trusted systems in order to support user trust judgments [21- 
22, 24, 26]. For example, McCune et al. [21] state that it is the 
user who may need to use one device to verify the trustworthiness 
of another device, and yet, cannot verify trustworthiness because 
both devices are dependent on other devices. They offer the 
iTurtle solution as a single verification device, “an unambiguous 
point from which trust originates for the user”. In another 
example, Parno [24] explains that in order for a user to trust a 
computer with a secret, “a user needs some assurance that the 
computer can be trusted”. Hence, it is the user who needs 
information about the state of the system and its nodes in order to 
judge the system as trustworthy. Extending this discussion to 
cloud computing environments, Schiffman et al. [26] state that “a 
cloud customer must be able to verify that the cloud’s integrity 
has not been compromised and that it is functioning within the 
parameters necessary to satisfy the customers’ security needs.” In 
this research, the user is conceptualized as the consumer of the 
functionality that a system provides. 
Less common is research that focuses on the user as the creator of 
systems and software. For example, Balebako et al. [4] engage 
developers in software development. Indirectly, trust plays a role 
for their study participants because they are making trust 
decisions by relying upon the functionality that is provided by the 
modules that they use.  
Security researchers have long acknowledged the need to consider 
the user in designing for trust [10, 21-22, 24, 26]. For example, 
Camp [10] argues that:  
“experts focus on the considerable technological challenges of 
securing networks, building trust mechanisms, and devising 
security policies. Although these efforts are essential, that trust 
and security would be even better served if designs more 
systematically addressed the (sometimes irrational) people and 
institutions served by networked information systems.”  
Though research regarding the trust perceptions of IT security 
professionals is limited, various studies have explored some 
aspects of their experiences [2, 7, 15, 29].   Sundaramurthy et al. 
[29] conducted long-term participant observation in order to 
understand analysts’ work1 and build tools that addressed their 
needs. The primary function of the analyst in this study differs 
from that of a system administrator who manages, maintains, and 
secures infrastructure. In addition, these researchers did not 
explicitly focus on the ways in which analysts’ conceptualize trust 
                                                             
1 The primary responsibility of the analyst in this study was to 
find matches in alert logs that would move the investigation of 
an alert forward.  
in computing infrastructure. Botta et al. [7] conduct a field study 
of IT professionals with the objective to build theory about how 
they practice security management given their human limitations 
and the realities of their workplace. Their results suggest that the 
job of IT security management is distributed across multiple 
employees often affiliated with different organizational units. 
Furnell et al. [15] investigate the challenges that IT Security 
practitioners face in their organizations, including the interaction 
among human, organizational, and technological factors. The 
work identifies 18 challenges that can affect IT Security 
management within an organization. Albrechtsen et al. [2] explore 
the digital divide between users and security managers.  In their 
study, security managers do not implement/administer the security 
plan, but are mainly concerned with the non-technical aspects of 
information security, such as developing documented systems, 
arranging awareness campaigns, and supporting decision-makers 
at the line management level. Their findings show that managers 
and users have limited interactions, which leads to divergent 
views on what security means.  
While the work of Albrechtsen et al. [2] examine the security 
perceptions of security managers and users, there is a gap in the 
literature regarding the security and trust perceptions of system 
administrators.  There is a need to respond to this gap with a study 
aimed at understanding and subsequently measuring users’ (i.e., 
system administrators’) trust perceptions and incorporating this 
information into an integrity-based model of trust. Closing this 
gap could illuminate the utility of trusted systems when widely 
deployed to harden and evaluate the integrity of 
cyberinfrastructure. 
3. PROPOSED MODEL 
To orient our research questions, we present an integrated trust 
framework. This framework uses a process-oriented approach to 
derive and define a requirements-driven trust model.  The ultimate 
goal of this work is to deploy this model in real world 
environments.   
Our notion of trust is derived from requirements for 
hardening/securing systems. We take these requirements and 
situate them within the context of trusted computing, which 
provides a means for establishing a root and foundation of trust, 
enforcing system integrity, and attesting to the system state.  Our 
proposed model is comprised of two components that create a 
feedback loop by which information is shared the components.  
Using a trusted computing approach to implement trust can 
require a complex set of interactions.  McCune et al. [21] simplify 
the presentation of these interactions. Figure 1 expands this view 
and illustrates an implementation of an integrity-based trust model 
that uses a hardware component along with trusted hardware to 
create a trusted computing base.  
Components A-G are derived from work by Harris and Hill [18], 
and comprise a trusted computing mechanism for enforcing 
integrity-based trust. Components H and I extend the mechanism 
by integrating user requirements and perceptions into the 
framework for establishing, measuring and assessing trust. (H) 
represents users’ trust requirements. (I) represents users’ 
perceptions of trust. The user in our system is the administrator 
who is responsible for managing, maintaining and securing the 
system. The arrow between H and I represents the relationship 
between H and I; users’ perceptions of trust based upon users’ 
trust requirements. 
Components A through G of Figure 1 illustrate our initial trust 
model. A separate hardware component and trusted grub serve as 
the root of trust. Dark solid lines represent the extension of trust 
from trusted boot loader (A) to a trusted kernel enabled to 
measure any software that is loaded (B) to the Trust services that 
support system attestation and integrity verification (D) and 
finally (if the trusted computing base is established) the 
Application (E). In this example, the kernel mounts the 
compressed ISO (C) as indicated by a solid line prior to starting 
the Trust services. This image may contain additional tools for 
establishing and measuring trust that are not provided by the 
kernel.  Dashed lines show components of the system that are to 
be evaluated to determine whether they meet the trust 
requirements of the system. Any new file added to the system 
would also have a dashed line. All software must meet the trust 
criteria in order for a trusted state to be established and private 
data to be unsealed (F).  With the information in (G), remote 
attestation can occur with the peers of the network.   
 
Figure 1. Process-Oriented Trust Framework  
When the Trusted Computing Group’s (TCG) Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) [17] is used to implement Components A-G, these 
components enforce requirements for ensuring the trustworthiness 
of both the identity and the state of the system.  These two 
requirements are essential for establishing secure 
communications.   
The TPM, along with the Trusted Software Stack (TSS) provide 
mechanisms for creating unique cryptographic identities and for 
attesting a system’s state using signed cryptographic hashes of 
files. Any system intending to utilize these features must ensure 
that trust metrics are extended from the hardware security 
mechanisms (secure BIOS/TPM) through the boot loader to the 
operating system (OS) and finally to the application requiring the 
trust relationship. 
 
3.1 Bridging the Trust Gap  
Components A through G in Figure 1 are effective in assessing 
and establishing trust when the software stacks of the 
communicating entities are assumed to be relatively static. This 
assumption does not hold for many cyberinfrastructure domains. 
When changes to the software stack are infrequent, administrators 
can specify the version of code to be executed for each software 
component, and deploy mechanisms that enforce those policies. 
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Such mechanisms are less effective in dynamic environments, 
where software updates are applied without delay, and end-user 
systems execute varying configurations.  Thus, there isn’t a “one-
size-fits-all” approach to assessing, establishing and maintaining 
trust within cyberinfrastructure.   
The objectives of the proposed work are to: (1) capture the 
security and trust perceptions of system administrators so that we 
may understand how they characterize secure and trusted systems; 
(2) identify and bridge the gaps between the integrity-based trust 
model in Figure 1 and trust models that are being applied in real-
world environments.  
3.2 Trust Use Case 
The proposed research is part of a larger project that explores 
what it means to trust cyberinfrastructure in different types of 
computing environments.  Our initial use case is that of an 
academic department’s computing environment that is tightly 
contained, but yet dynamic. We focus on issues of trust as they 
relate to managing and securing cyberinfrastructure within this 
environment.  
The department’s computing environment contains a diverse array 
of infrastructure components.  Table 1 below provides details of 
the types of devices that are supported by the IT Staff. 







Linux 88 111 265  
Windows 6 16 395 107 
Mac 4  176 165 
iOS    89 
Android    65 
ChromeOS    2 
Table 1: Departmental Infrastructure Summary 
 
The department’s infrastructure is distributed across five primary 
physical locations, including the University’s Data Center.  The 
Data Center is an F-4 tornado proof facility with backup power 
and chillers, on-site operations personnel, and 2-factor secure 
access. The academic department rents rack space from the 
university at the Data Center, including six physical servers and 
17 virtual machines.  These servers store the department’s 
primary, critical, and sensitive data.  
Figure 2 illustrates a high-level architecture of the department’s 
infrastructure and its relationship with the University’s 
infrastructure, including the Data Center, and other external 
entities, which we refer to as the “World”. The outer circle 
represents the world. The first inner circle, representing the 
University, is illustrated with dashed lines, which indicates open 
ports that enable communication between the university and the 
outside world. The two smaller circles within the University 
denote the Department and the Data Center infrastructures.  The 
overlap between the Department and the Data Center depicts the 
Department’s critical data resources that are stored within the 
Data Center.  The Data Center nodes can communicate without 
limitation with other nodes within the Data Center, but explicit 
firewall rules must be enabled to allow communication between 
the Department and the Data Center nodes. 
 
Figure 2: System Architecture 
3.2.1 Trust Requirements for the Use Case 
As previously stated, the trusted computing model, which relies 
on system hardening, may not be effective for dynamic 
environments with frequent changes to the software stack of 
infrastructure components. During our initial conversations with 
the Department’s IT, we’ve learned the following: 
• To facilitate research and creativity, the system must 
support dynamic changes to nodes, which further 
complicates the process of specifying software 
hardening policies; 
• Functional services, such as instruction and 
experimentation, contribute to the dynamic nature of the 
environment and prevent IT staff from hardening some 
infrastructure components; 
• Requirements to support external collaborators 
introduce infrastructure components that are outside of 
the administrative control of the IT staff; 
• Given the dynamic nature of the environment, integrity-
based trust mechanisms that do not allow a range of 
acceptable software versions may produce many false 
positives, rendering them ineffective for assessing the 
trustworthiness of dynamic components; 
• Behavioral-based assessment mechanisms (e.g., 
anomaly detection) are often used to assess the trust of 
nodes in dynamic environments. 
3.2.2 Characterizing Trust Requirement 
In order to integrate the trust requirements and perceptions of trust 
of the system administrator into the trust model, we first need a 
framework for capturing these requirements and perceptions. In 
preliminary discussions with a lead system administrator, we 
observed that the administrator discussed protection mechanisms 
from the perspective of protecting against threats to the system 
and not necessarily from the perspective of satisfying a security 
requirement or goal. Unfortunately, the reality of managing 
systems is often reactive.  Therefore, a more natural way of 
eliciting trust requirements from system administrators is to 
engage them in an exercise of threat modeling. During the threat 
modeling process, assets are identified; threats against the assets 
are enumerated; the likelihood and damage of threats are 
quantified; and mechanisms for mitigating threats are proposed. 
Myagmar et al. [23] champion threat modeling as a means of 
eliciting security requirements and offer that an initial set of 
security requirements can be obtained by converting threat 
statements into “shall not” requirement statements.  
Quantifying the risk of threats enables administrators to rank the 
order in which threats should be addressed.  Various approaches 
have been proposed for characterizing and quantifying the risk of 
threats, including calculating risk as the product of the damage 
potential and the likelihood of occurrence, Risk = Criticality * 
Likelihood of Occurrence [20]. Dread, an approach proposed by 
Microsoft, calculates risk across several categories, including: 
Damage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, 
and Discoverability [20].  Using Dread, a threat is rated on a scale 
from 1 to 10, for each category, with the resulting risk being the 
average of all ratings. Butler and Fischbeck [9] propose a multiple 
attribute threat index (TI) for assessing the risk of a threat.  TI 
captures the relative importance of each type of threat [9], where 
TIa = Freqa * (∑j=attributes Wj * Xaj), and Wj is the attribute weight 
and Xaj is the most likely outcome value for the threat. 
While quantifying risks will enable us to capture an organization’s 
security requirements, Pfleeger [25] advises that we should avoid 
false precision by doing the following: 
• Base the probability distribution of a threat/attack 
occurring on historical data, not just on expert 
judgment; 
• Since "both scientists and lay people may underestimate 
the error and unreliability in small samples of data, 
particularly when the results are consistent with 
preconceived, emotion-based beliefs”, we are to be 
mindful of the size of our experiments and the 
scalability of our results. 
3.2.3 Assessing Mechanisms 
While threat modeling enables us to capture requirements, a 
system administrator’s perceptions of the trustworthiness of a 
system are directly tied to her assessment of the effectiveness of 
mechanisms that have been proposed to mitigate threats. In 
addition to effectiveness, there is also the cost/benefit tradeoff of 
one mechanism versus another. If the cost of deploying and 
maintaining a mechanism exceeds the perceived benefit, its 
overall effectiveness will be rated/perceived as low. Therefore, the 
challenge of capturing perceptions of trustworthiness is providing 
a framework that enables the system administrator to compare 
mechanisms that have been proposed for mitigating the same 
threat. 
We propose to leverage and extend Bulter’s [8] Security Attribute 
Evaluation Method (SAEM) framework.  SAEM is a cost-benefit 
analysis process for analyzing security design decisions that 
involves four steps: 1) assessing the benefit of a security 
technology, 2) evaluating the effect of security technologies in 
mitigating risks, 3) assessing coverage security technology, and 4) 
analyzing cost. The SAEM process uses the previously defined 
threat index to characterize threats and potential attacks.  The 
perceptions of security managers are used to quantify the benefit 
of security mechanisms. In an effort to avoid the pitfalls of 
quantifying perceptions that may vary broadly [25], we propose to 
augment perception ratings with historical data that quantifies the 
increase/reduction of the occurrence of attacks after a specific 
security mechanism has been deployed. 
4. PROPOSED STUDY 
In the previous section, we proposed a model that could 
simultaneously account for an integrity-based conceptualization of 
trust within cyberinfrastructure environments and a perception-
based conceptualization of trust based on the trust requirements of 
those who manage the infrastructure. The integrity-based trust 
portion of the proposed model (i.e., the aggregation of letters A 
through G in Figure 1) has been previously validated [10]. On the 
other hand, the perception-based trust portion of the framework 
(i.e., the aggregation of letters H through I in Figure 1) has not yet 
been validated. Toward that end, we propose a scale development 
study to specify the components of H and I in Figure 1 and 
subsequently test the entire model (i.e., letters A through I in 
Figure 1). Specifically, we propose a study aimed at specifying 
perception-based trust in a way that is quite novel because it is 
grounded in the trust requirements and perceptions of system 
administrators.  
To ascertain system administrators’ trust requirements and 
subsequently measure their perceptions based upon their 
requirements, we propose using the established methodology of 
scale development [12, 28]. The premise for proposing scale 
development for this study is that, if trust perception does in fact 
exist, then it ought to be definable and measurable. Although scale 
development has never been used to examine users’ trust in 
cyberinfrastructure, it is promising for this study because prior 
research demonstrates that users in other research domains are 
capable of articulating their trust requirements, and researchers 
are, in turn, capable of measuring users’ trust perceptions based 
upon their requirements [13-14]. 
Scale development is a rigorous methodology consisting of four 
steps: 1) Construct Definition, 2) Generating an Item Pool, 3) 
Designing the Scale, and 4) Full Administration and Item 




Figure 2. Scale development procedure adapted from Spector 
[28] and DeVellis [12]. 
 
Each of the four steps of scale development has its own set of 
methods. The methods of each step build on one another and, in 
turn, each step builds on the one preceding it. Hence the arrow 
pointing from left to right containing the steps of scale 
development in Figure 2. The remainder of this section describes 
the four steps of scale development in detail, including description 
of the methods that are necessary for execution of each step.  
 4.1 Step 1—Construct Definition 
We will apply Step 1 of scale development—construct 
definition—in two ways. First, we will focus on clearly defining 
our goals for measuring trust. Second, we will conduct focus 
groups with a sample of real-world system administrators to 
understand their trust requirements. To engage the administrators, 
focus group questions will center on what security means to them, 
what it means to them for infrastructure to be secure, and what it 
means to them for infrastructure to be trustworthy (or in a 
trustworthy state). To further guide the discussion, the 
administrators will engage in threat modeling and mechanism 
assessment to elicit their trust requirements. The focus groups will 
conclude with discussion of and reactions to the integrity-based 
trust framework represented by Components A through G in 
Figure 1. Presenting this integrity-based trust model will be 
reserved until the end of the focus groups in an effort to avoid 
biasing the administrators’ notions of trust before they get a 
chance to articulate what trust in computing infrastructure actually 
means to them.  
4.2 Step 2—Generating an Item Pool 
We will derive items for a trust perception measurement scale 
from participants’ responses during focus groups that we will 
complete during Step 1 on the topic of their trust requirements. 
Specifically, we will derive items from the focus groups by 
turning statements that participants provide regarding their trust 
requirements into items for measurement of trust perception.  
4.3 Step 3—Designing the Scale 
During Step 3, we will transform the item pool resulting from 
Step 2 into a survey instrument for pretesting and refinement. Step 
3 will involve seven activities. First, we will select stems for the 
items that are appropriate for the study (e.g., “The node is…”, 
“The system is…”, “The OS is…”). Second, we will select 
response categories and choices for the items. For example, we 
could use a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (very untrustworthy) to 
+3 (very trustworthy). We could also include the option -99 (not 
applicable) for participants to utilize if they feel they have no 
basis upon which to evaluate an item. Third, we will write 
instructions for participants regarding the survey. For example, 
the instructions will ask participants to rate how trustworthy they 
would perceive a node, given the trust requirement described in 
each item. Fourth, we will select web administration for the 
survey to make it easier for the study participants to take the 
survey and to ensure electronic data collection. Fifth, we will 
randomize the order of the items to avoid order effects. Sixth, we 
will pretest the survey by conducting cognitive interviews with a 
sample of participants. Seventh, we will revise the survey items 
and instructions based upon the cognitive interviewees’ feedback.  
4.4 Step 4—Full Administration and Item 
Analysis  
During Step 4, we will administer the survey instrument resulting 
from Step 3 to a large sample of systems administrators via online 
survey software. We will recruit participants who have real-world 
experience managing infrastructures from national labs and 
academic institutions to take our survey.   
To analyze the resulting data, we will perform two types of 
analysis: item analysis and exploratory factor analysis. Item 
analysis will involve analysis of item variances, item-total 
correlations, item means, and item standard deviations [12]. After 
performing item analysis, we will conduct exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA)2 to establish the factor structure of the trust items 
[12]. We will operationalize important trust items as items with 
high factor loadings on factors with large eigenvalues.3  What will 
not be immediately clear is exactly which items are the strongest 
indicators of trust. Consequently, we will use exploratory factor 
analysis as a tool to help identify the most critical items for 
measurement of trust.  
We will perform EFA on the items that the participants evaluate. 
We will run EFA on the items using principal axis factoring with 
oblique rotation, as there is no reason why we would not expect 
whatever factors arise not to be correlated. We will rely upon 
results of Cattell’s [11] scree test to determine the number of 
factors to retain. To assign items to factors, we will consider 
factor loadings equal to or higher than .32 [30].  
In the remainder of this paper, we report the possible outcomes 
that our proposed framework is robust enough to capture. We also 
discuss the implications of what our study demonstrates regarding 
a user-oriented trust measurement strategy for inspiring new 
thinking in trust and security research. 
5. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
Table 1 illustrates the possible trust outcomes that our proposed 
model is designed to take into account. As shown in Table 1, there 
are six possible outcomes when considering integrity- and 
perception-based trust.  The most favorable possible outcome (Y, 
Y) is listed first. In this circumstance, the cyberinfrastructure 
proves itself trustworthy (i.e., integrity-based trust) and users 
perceive that environment as trustworthy (i.e., users perceive the 
environment as aligned with their trust requirements or 
perception-based trust). The second, less favorable but still 
possible outcome is that the environment is verified as trustworthy 
from an integrity-based trust perspective (i.e., Y), but yet actual 
administrators do not perceive the environment as trustworthy 
(i.e., N). A third possible outcome is that the environment cannot 
be verified as trustworthy from an integrity-based perspective 
(i.e., N), and yet actual administrators perceive the environment as 
trustworthy (i.e., Y). Finally, the least favorable possible outcome 
is that the environment cannot be verified as trustworthy from an 
integrity-based perspective (i.e., N), and actual administrators also 
fail to perceive the environment as trustworthy (i.e., N).  
 
 
                                                             
2  Exploratory factor analysis is a tool used to describe the 
correlation between observable variables (i.e., measurement 
items such as survey questions) and unobservable variables (i.e., 
constructs that are not directly available to the senses, in this 
case, trust perception). 
3 In factor analysis, it is assumed that the reason items correlate is 
because they are related to the same concept (i.e., they share a 
common factor). Factor loadings demonstrate the degree to 
which items correlate with factors. Eigenvalues are statistical 
measures of how much variance factors explain. The greater the 
eigenvalue, the more the factor reflects the concept under 
investigation, in this case, trust. Items with high factor loadings 
are the result of factors that contribute greatly to those items. 
For these reasons, we will analyze our data focusing on items 
with high factor loadings on factors with large eigenvalues. For 
more on exploratory factor analysis, see [12].   
Table 1. Possible Trust Outcomes. 
TRUST 







Although (Y, Y) is the most favorable possible outcome and (N, 
N) is the least favorable possible outcome, both are important 
because they represent correspondence between integrity-based 
and perception-based trust. Our trust model allows for comparison 
along these lines such that we can empirically examine the 
correspondence between these different forms of trust that we are 
bringing together in the context of our model. 
(Y, N) and (N, Y) represent instances where integrity-based and 
perception-based trusts are out of synch. These instances are 
important as well and would require more research to examine the 
root cause(s) of disconnect between both forms of trust.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
For nearly twenty years, researchers have called for a closer 
correspondence between technological security and trust research 
and research on the users of the advancements presented in such 
research [10, 31]. Few researchers have addressed this call. What 
is more common is that the concept of the user is often evoked as 
the beneficiary of the advancements described in security and 
trust research, but yet there is little research on users to verify the 
utility of the research findings for real-world users [21-22, 24].  
We take the next step by creating a feedback loop between system 
administrators and the mechanisms for establishing and evaluating 
trust. We propose to extend the current work in trust and security 
research by examining technological definitions of trust and 
security alongside users’ perceptions of those definitions as they 
apply to technology with which they actually interact.  
To validate our results, we will deploy our survey to another 
sample of system administrators from national labs and academic 
institutions, conduct EFA on the resulting data, and compare 
results of the second run of EFA with results from the first run of 
EFA. If the results are similar with regard to the best performing 
trust items, we will include those items in a scale for measurement 
of trust perception. By design our proposed study will offer a 
much higher level of validation than what is typically reported in 
trust and security research.  
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